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7. HELICOPTER SIMULATOR QUALIFICATION
B RIAN HAMPSON
I think the one thing that all of us have in common
here today, and I believe I am quite safe in saying this, is
that we are all supporters of the view that simulators are
an acceptable, if not essential, method of training and
checking aircrew, and that includes helicopter aircrew as
well. After all, I believe that is the reason we are here this
week, to discuss how the use of simulation may be
defined in respect to the training events for which it is
deemed appropriate, the level of the technology to be
used, and the criteria that will enable us to get the simula-
tor approved. From these bases will fall out the design of
the simulator, and this will in turn be constrained by the
technology available, which in turn will perhaps lead us to
modify the use and the criteria baselines.
So as you will see, to some extent we are going to go
around in circles. I think this is to be expected at this
phase of our deliberations, but I believe there are some
things we all should understand from the outset which
will help reduce the number of circles we are going to
describe this week. I base my comments on my experi-
ence in a similar type of exercise for fixed-wing aircraft in
which I participated both on the international and national
levels and also as a result of the knowledge I have of the
difficulties faced by the simulator manufacturers in build-
ing and designing a simulator for any aircraft.
We are fortunate in having a pattern in the fixed-wing
training and evaluation criteria from which we may start.
AC 120-40B is a well-debated and currently used docu-
ment known to most of us. However, as most of you who
have reviewed the draft AC 120-XX prepared for this
study can attest, slavish adherence to 40B will not pro-
duce a good helicopter document. And I am not leveling
any criticism at the FAA in this area.
For example, in attempting to get a direct read-across,
but also by taking note of the unique situation of rotary-
wing aircraft, the objective tests defined in this draft circu-
lar total over 800. And that is quite an impractical number
for any operator to attempt to run, either on an ongoing
basis or at the time of initial or recurrent inspection.
I suggest, therefore, that we must begin by using the
format of 40B, perhaps, but then, by analyzing the impor-
tant aspects of helicopter training and competency check-
ing, define the set of objective tests to ensure that the
device is capable of meeting these training requirements.
To the objective test must be added, as in 40B and its pre-
decessors, both functional and subjective tests to ensure
the necessary realism. We found in the international
forum that we had to modify our baseline document to
take into account specific training requirements of other
national operators. A good example I think was the
Australians, who have a requirement that their pilots
demonstrate they can do a rejected takeoff of maximal
outweight. They naturally said if we are going to check
somebody on a simulator doing this, we have to ensure
that the simulator correctly represents a rejected takeoff of
maximal outweight. I think that gives us a pattern of what
we should be doing here later in the week.
If we agree on this, then we must take a closer look at
these objective, functional, and subjectives tests. Each test
will consist of a description of the test, a statement of the
acceptable tolerance between the flown data and the simu-
lator's response, that is, the validation, the flight condition
or conditions under which the test is to be conducted, and
finally, perhaps, some indication as to the method of
proving that compliance. For instance, is a time-history
necessary or will a snapshot do? You may think that this
is a simple enough matter, but those of us who have been
involved in the fixed-wing regulatory criteria discussions
know only too well that the method of actually carrying
out the test is as important as all the other aspects of that
test. Again, to give an example, insistence on totally inte-
grated or end-to-end tests where the control input is
applied without tolerance, and the output, that is, the
result of the input on the aircraft, is measured to be accu-
rate within a given tolerance, is rarely practical within
currently available technology.
The greatest problem is the manner in which the air-
craft data are collected or presented. To again use an
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example from the fixed-wing area, if the data are obtained
by plotting, say, the force or displacement of the control
column and its effect on the surface, and if then a second
plot is obtained by taking a displacement of the control
surface and plotting its effect on the aircraft path, it will
be quite impossible to match the simulator's results by
putting an input to the simulator control column and mea-
suring the effect upon the simulator's flight path, unless
the tolerances are generous. That is, it's quite impossible
if you are going to apply the same sort of tolerances as
those that are now specified. To be fair, this is not the
manner in which rotary-wing checkout data have been
presented in the past, but the accumulation of tolerances
on the aircraft owing to differences in manufacture, main-
tenance, age, ambient conditions, and indeed even the
data-measuring equipment, would ensure that the end
result is very much less accurate than that usually permit-
ted by the defined tolerances of the simulator. What is
essential is a practical realization of the problems
involved and the manner in which the data have been pro-
vided. In the fixed-wing world where aircraft manufactur-
ers have been collecting this type of data for many years
now, it has been generally accepted that without spending
huge sums of money, the currently available data-
gathering equipment and instrumentation are capable of
an accuracy that is satisfactory for aircraft certification
purposes and even for its intelligent use in performing
checking. However, it is often not accurate enough to
validate total end-to-end system operation in a simulator.
To many of us in the study group, the use of the term
"application of good engineering judgment" is an essential
part of understanding how a simulator may be said to
meet the approval criteria.
For the last few minutes I have addressed a particular
issue which in part concerns data and how they are used. I
believe a much more fundamental problem in the simula-
tion of a helicopter is the amount and the type of the
design and checkout data which are available. For many
years now the operators of simulators, the bodies repre-
senting them, and the manufacturers of simulators for
fixed-wing aircraft have been trying-to define a minimum
standard for the data that are to be supplied for these pur-
poses. The third edition of the IATA Data Document was
published in 1990. it is the result ofseverai years of effort
by people very experienced in the manufacture, testing,
and use of fixed-wing simulators. And it enabled some
progress to be made in defining acceptable criteria for the
fixed-wing simulator. Few, if any, rotary-wing aircraft
manufacturers come anywhere close to meeting similar
62 ¸
standards which may have been defined, but I do note
with pleasure that the data analysis document provided by
Augusta for the A-109 simulator indicates that they may
be an exception to this criticism. Cost is only one of the
reasons given for the failings of the aircraft manufactur-
ers. Because helicopter simulator approvals have not been
such a prominent item as the fixed-wing ones until now, it
is easy to understand why the scope and accuracy of heli-
copter data packages have been inferior to even the
mediocre fixed-wing packages. What must be accepted is
that any move toward defining higher criteria for evalua-
tion, testing, and [ifi_0rovement in the training obtained
from helicopter simulators will require an order of magni-
tude ofi-mpr0vement in the data being supplied.
It has been said that the average helicopter data pack-
age is the equivalent now of what the fixed-wing data
package was 15years ago; some would even say 20 years
ago. A continuation of this approach is not commensurate
with the building and evaluation by a regulatory authority
of a helicopter simulator equivalent to even Phase 2,
Level C standards. The success of the FAA's Advanced
Simulation Plan for fixed-wing aircraft is well-known, but
I hazard a guess that it would not have been so effective in
reaching its goal of zero flight-time training were it not
for the work put in by the IATA Flight Simulation
Committee in defining the required level of data.
Unfortunately, iATA has not, to my knowledge, con-
vened a committee to set up similar data standards for
rotary-wing aircraft, although the "Aircraft Data and Sup-
port Requirements Document for Aircrew Training
Devices," produced in 1988 by the Naval Training Sys-
tems Center, does address some of the issues, including
those of the data requirement for rotor-map and blade-
element models. This general deficiency must, in my
view, be rectified as part of the exercise on which we are
about to embark.
I would now like to give some examples of the areas
that I believe are insufficiently addressed in current data
packages. First, helicopter data packages frequently do
not includeanymodels at all and, hence, no proof-of-
match do cumenL It is left to the simulator manufacturer to
design these. This is not the most efficient way of solving
this problem and may lead to _eater variations in the
simulation of one manufacturer's product and another's
than is now the case for fixed-wing aircraft.
Second, the inherent instability of the helicopter is
known to all those who attempt to fly it. Most modern
types have stability augmentation systems which are used
full time. Th e data covering operations without the
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systems in use are sparse, yet this is an area of prime
importance to training.
Third, vibration is likewise a fact of life in heli-
copters. Indeed, operation is frequently constrained by the
need to avoid and suppress critical vibration frequencies.
But the data provided on those vibrations are rarely
comprehensive.
Fourth, flying operations of helicopters, especially
operations close to the ground or to the surface of water,
require accurate modeling of the downwash and knowl-
edge of the prevailing conditions. This in turn requires
very accurate recording of ambient conditions with a
larger number of parameters being recorded at a higher
frequency than is now common.
Based on the analysis document provided by
Augusta, which I mentioned previously, it would seem
that they at least accept that none of these difficulties is
insurmountable. It is this recognition of the need for a
level of data commensurate with modem techniques and
technology that is required. However, it is unfortunate that
this is in exact contravention to the view I have heard
expressed here today and in many other forums of this
sort, that is, the matter of reducing cost.
You cannot get this level of data and this level of
simulation without spending a lot of money. Some of the
issues of cost have been raised this morning and indeed in
the last paper. Something like 60% of the cost of a fixed-
wing Phase 3 simulator goes not to the building of the
simulator but to providing the data package and the air-
craft parts and avionics that go into that simulator. And
that is a problem I don't see any way of overcoming sim-
ply, if we are to provide the degree of simulation that is
expected of a Phase 3 device. So we are faced with a
$12 million or more bill for a Phase 3 helicopter simula-
tor. That's not to say we cannot produce Phase 2, Phase i,
or even flight-training devices at less cost. It is a matter
of, as the last speaker said, looking at the return you are
going to get.
To put this in context, we heard some figures men-
tioned earlier about the price of operating a simulator. If
you take the cost of operating an airplane and compare it
with the cost of operating a simulator, it is a ratio of about
10-to-1. To give you the top-end example, if you look at
the cost of ownership of a 747 simulator on a per-hour fly-
ing basis, which includes the amortization, the cost of the
device, and the building in which it is housed and all the
utilities it needs, you come up with an operating cost of
about $450 to $500 an hour. If you go to the airplane and
use the same criteria, that is, cost of purchasing the air-
plane, cost of the crew, the increased cost of maintenance
caused by the effects of the repeated landing cycles on the
engine, the wheels, the brakes, and the undercarriage, and
the additional insurance costs, it is an accepted fact in the
fixed-wing world that the cost of operating a Boeing 747
for 1 hour of training is $16,000. As I say, that is a top-
end one. On an average we are talking about a cost ratio
of 10-to-1 in operating the airplane over the simulator.
Now, obviously for somebody who is only operating
two or three airplanes, they have a problem. And I think
we need to get the thing into proper perspective. Unless
you think I am being unduly pessimistic, let me hasten to
reassure you, we believe the manufacturers have proved
their ability to provide highly accurate simulations of
some of the most advanced helicopters currently in opera-
tion. These have, almost without exception, been built as
military programs and have been successful because addi-
tional data have been provided through simulator data-
gathering exercises on the aircraft and by a large invest-
ment of pilot and design engineer time in tuning the mod-
els or final results to meet the objective assessments of the
pilots. Such expensive methods will probably not be
acceptable to the average civil helicopter operator, who in
most cases will not have the resources of the military nor
of the large fixed-wing aircraft operators.
Yet despite holding this view, I can also add that
because of the special circumstances surrounding some of
the training problems for helicopters, there may be no
other alternatives. For example, in the relatively high
speeds encountered even in large transport airplanes, the
human vestibular system is easily fooled into believing
that the onset cues or short-term changes produced by the
motion platform are being sustained. With the heli-
copter's low-speed operations, the combination of visual
cuing and motion cuing may not have such a good effect.
I believe the motion cues become more important in a
relative sense, because the rate-of-change cues from the
visual scene at low speeds are small. Not all of my col-
leagues will agree with this point of view and that, in
itself, is sufficient reason for raising the subject now.
The adoption of an advisory circular to control the
evaluation and approval of helicopter simulators is
specifically designed to remove all but the smallest
amount of subjectivity and to permit recurrent inspections
to be carried out from an objective baseline. The first of
these aims may be impossible to obtain until better data
are available. And the the second may prove impractical
and probably unacceptable to the regulatory authorities.
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My point in raising the issues I have address e d in this
presentation is to warn against falling into the trap of
thinking that all that is necessary as an outcome of this
workshop and the ensuing working group for the advisory
circular is the definition of the training events and the
evaluation criteria. Both of these items are essential to the
task at hand, but they will be negated unless we also
address the problem of the data and how they are to be
used.
It has taken some 12 years to reach that conclusion in
the fixed-wing world. I submit we cannot afford to give
the same amount of time to helicopter simulators Thank
you very much.
MR. CARVER: Brian, is not today's problem with
helicopter data collection and the construction of the doc-
ument similar to the one which has been sent out here by
Ed [Boothe] and his compatriots and the same situation
we were in with fixed-wing where actually we have all
managed working together to achieve everything that is
required. Are we not, by using your suggestion, choking
off development for the future?
MR. HAMPSON; I think there is some value in what
you said, Paddy. My only comment really on what you
have said is that we have a different group of players here.
And what I was trying to do in my paper, and I am sure
you support the view, is to try and read across some of the
experience we got in the fixed-wing world so we do not
have to spend 12 years in the helicopter case, as we did in
reaching the con¢!usion we reached in the fixed-wing
case. And I certainly would not want to choke off any-
thing, but there are some exercises, were we to go back
12 years, in the fixed-wing case that we would almost cer-
tainly do differently. I do not think any of us who have
been involved in it would disagree with that.
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